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Strategically Pleading Intentional Torts in medical cases 
By Tina Cockburn, Associate Professor, Australian Centre for Health Law Research, School of Law, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane and Bill Madden, National Practice Group Leader – 
Medical Law, Slater and Gordon Lawyers; Adjunct Professor, Australian Centre for Health Law 
Research, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane. 
 
The opportunities and challenges faced by litigants who strategically plead 
intentional torts are borne out by two recent medical cases. Both arose out of dental 
treatment. Dean v Phung1  established some key principles which were clarified in 
White v Johnston. 2  Before considering those two cases it is worth examining the 
environment in which such intentional torts claims now exist. 
 
Following the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence,3 non-uniform legislative changes 
to the law of negligence were introduced across Australia which have imposed 
limitations on liability and quantum of damages in cases where a person has been 
injured through the fault of another.4 While it seems that, given the limitation of the 
scope of the review and recommendations to negligently caused damage,5  the Ipp 
Review reforms were meant to be limited to injury resulting from negligent acts rather 
than  intentional torts, the extent to which the civil liability legislation applies to 
intentional torts differs across Australia.  
 
Intentional torts are exempted from the operation of the civil liability legislation to 
various degrees across Australia6.  
 
In Queensland it appears that the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) applies to intentional 
torts, as the act is expressed to apply “to any civil claim for damages for harm7” and 
                                                            
1 [2012] NSWCA 223 (Dean v Phung).  
2 [2015] NSWCA 18 (White v Johnston). 
3 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report, 2002, 
http://www.amatas.com.au/assets/ipp_report.pdf (Ipp Report).  
4 Civil Liability Act 2000 (Qld); Civil Law (Wrongs Act) 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Personal 
Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas);  Civil 
Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). 
5 See for example, Ipp Report, [1.14];[1.10]; Recommendation 1, [2.1]. 
6 See Tina Cockburn and Bill Madden, ‘Intentional Torts in Medical Cases’, (2006) 13 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 311. 
there is no express exclusion of intentional torts8. Similarly, in the Australian Capital 
Territory, the damages provisions9 of the Civil Law (Wrongs Act) 2002 (ACT) are 
expressed to apply to “all claims for damages for personal injury10”. The Northern 
Territory legislation, Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) is 
also expressed to apply to “all civil claims for damages for personal injuries11” and 
there is no exclusion for intentional torts. 
 
By contrast, in New South Wales, the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) contains a clear 
exclusion in respect of “an intentional act that is done with intent to cause injury or 
death12”. A similar exclusion appears in the Tasmanian legislation13. In Victoria, the 
provisions in the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) which relate to personal injury damages14 
and the recovery of damages for non-economic loss15 do not apply to “an intentional 
act that is done with intent to cause death or injury16”. There is also an intentional 
torts exclusion in the Western Australian  legislation, the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA), in that certain damages provisions do not apply to “an unlawful intentional act 
that is done with an intention to cause personal injury to a person, whether or not a 
particular person”17.  
 
The South Australian legislation, the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) perhaps most 
closely follows the Ipp Review Report recommendations by providing that the 
damages provisions apply, inter alia, to cases “where damages are claimed for 
personal injury arising from … an accident caused wholly or in part by negligence or 
some other unintentional tort on the part of a person other than the injured 
person18...” 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
7 Civil Liability Act 2000 (Qld) s4.  
8 Civil Liability Act 2000 (Qld) s5 (Civil Liability excluded from Act) does not refer to intentional torts. 
9 Civil Law (Wrongs Act) 2002 (ACT) Part 7.1 (Damages for personal injuries – exclusions and limitations).  
10 Civil Law (Wrongs Act) 2002 (ACT) s93.  
11 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s4(1). 
12 Civil Liability Act NSW (2002) s3B(1)(a). 
13 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s3B(1)(a). 
14 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) Part VB . 
15 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) Part VBA. 
16 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s28C(2)(a) (intentional acts excluded from Part VB personal injury damages); 
s28LC(2)(a) (intentional acts excluded from Part VBA personal injury for non‐economic loss). 
17 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s3B(1). The element of “unlawfulness” is found in s52 Civil Liability Act (Qld) 
which excludes intentional torts from the prohibition on the award of exemplary and aggravated damages.    
18 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s51(a)(ii).  
Given the statutory exclusions for intentional torts in some jurisdictions as set out 
above, there has been a renewed interest in pleading intentional torts so as to fall 
within the statutory exclusions and avoid restrictions on liability and damages caps 
and thresholds.  In addition, exemplary and aggravated damages may be available 
in intentional tort cases.19 In New South Wales, exemplary and aggravated damages 
are prohibited, but only in negligence actions20, so the common law tests in relation 
to the circumstances in which exemplary and aggravated damages may be awarded 
in intentional tort cases, such as intentional trespass to persons, are unaffected.  The 
Queensland legislation contains a statutory prohibition on the award of exemplary 
and aggravated damages, subject to certain exceptions, including an express 
exception in cases of “an unlawful intentional act done with intent to cause personal 
injury21”.  The Northern Territory legislation goes further, imposing a general 
prohibition on the award of exemplary damages in personal injury claims, without 
exception22.  
In Kelly v Hazlett23 Justice Morden said:  
How the case is pleaded in many cases is more than a matter of mere academic interest. 
It will have important bearing on such matters as the incidence of the onus of proof, 
causation, the importance of expert medical evidence, the significance of medical 
judgement, proof of damage and, most important of course, the substantive basis upon 
which liability may be found.24   
However, as Professor Cane commented some fifteen years ago, “mental states are 
often difficult to prove; and the legal advantages gained by establishing tortious 
intention may not be sufficient to justify the attempt.”25 
 
1. Dean v Phung26 
                                                            
19 The Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) 
Act 2003 (NT); Wrongs Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); and  Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) are all 
silent on the issue of the availability of exemplary and aggravated damages.  
20 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s21. Section 21 provides as follows: In an action for the award of personal 
injury damages where the act or omission that caused the injury or death was negligence, a court cannot 
award exemplary or punitive damages or damages in the nature of aggravated damages (emphasis added). 
21 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s52. 
22 Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act (NT) 2003 s19. The section provides as follows: “A court must 
not award aggravated damages or exemplary damages in respect of a personal injury.” 
23 (1976) 75 DLR (3d) 536 . 
24 Ibid, 556. 
25 Peter Cane, Mens Rea in tort law (2000) 20 (4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 533, 533. 
26 This section draws on Bill Madden and Tina Cockburn, ‘An intentional act with intent to cause harm, in a 
medical context: Dean v Phung’, (2012) 20(8) Australian Health Law Bulletin 122.  
 
In Dean v Phung, the New South Wales Court of Appeal undertook the first 
substantial judicial analysis of the provisions which exclude intentional acts from the 
application of the civil liability legislation in the context of civil claims arising out of 
medical treatment.27 
 
On 19 December 2001, the appellant Mr Dean was injured in the course of his 
employment when a piece of timber struck him on the chin causing minor injuries to 
his front teeth. His teeth became sensitive, and as he was in pain, his employer 
arranged for him to see the respondent Dr Phung, a dental surgeon. Over a period of 
a little more than 12 months, Dr Phung carried out root canal therapy and fitted 
crowns on all of Mr Dean’s teeth. The treatment was undertaken during 53 
consultations at a cost of $73,640.28 
 
Mr Dean commenced proceedings against Dr Phung for negligence and trespass to 
the person, and claimed exemplary damages. At trial, Mr Dean recovered damages 
for admitted negligence, assessed in accordance with the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), but the outcome in the Court of Appeal was quite different. 
 
Intentional Torts exclusion does not establish a cause of action 
Importantly, the Court of Appeal highlighted the distinction between the application of 
the civil liability legislation exclusion and the need to establish the tort of trespass, 
which are quite distinct matters and involve the establishment of different elements:   
 
 Although the result may be the same in respect of each question, the questions themselves 
differ. Thus, in respect of a cause of action for trespass to the person arising from medical or 
dental treatment, liability will turn on the consent given by the patient (absent an emergency). 
The operation of s 3B(1)(a), on the other hand, focuses solely upon the intention of the 
defendant practitioner. Even where the defendant's conduct may be said to vitiate an 
apparent consent, the issues are not identical in each case and there may be a real question 
as to the party on whom the burden of proof lies. Because the statutory scheme is not 
                                                            
27For an earlier consideration see Tina Cockburn and Bill Madden, ‘Intentional torts claims in medical cases’ 
(2006) 13 Journal of Law and Medicine 311. 
28Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223, [1] (Basten JA). 
identified by reference to a particular cause of action, it is convenient to address the operation 
of s 3B and then the cause of action.29 
 
1.1 Application of s3B exclusion 
Section 3B of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)30 excludes certain categories of civil 
liability from the application of the Act:  
  
3B(1) The provisions of this Act do not apply to or in respect of civil liability (and awards of 
damages in those proceedings) as follows:(a) civil liability of a person in respect of an 
intentional act that is done by the person with intent to cause injury or death or that is sexual 
assault or other sexual misconduct committed by the person - the whole Act ...." 
 
In determining whether the exclusion applied, Justice Basten (with whom Beazley 
and Macfarlan JJA agreed) emphasised that the focus is on the intention of the 
medical practitioner. The language of the statutory exclusion was described as “not 
suggestive of concepts having some specific legal connotation”, but “rather language 
which encompassed a broad policy objective”... “to leave those who committed 
intentional torts to the operation of the general law.”31 
 
Basten JA stated that as a medical procedure will generally be an intentional act, the 
critical question became whether, in the circumstances, the treatment by Dr Phung 
was done with intent to cause injury.32 His Honour noted that injury is commonly 
understood as meaning harmful consequence, and in particular that “something 
which is done with a therapeutic intent, that is, to prevent, remove or ameliorate a 
disability or pathological condition, would not ordinarily be described as involving 
intent to cause injury. Indeed, even non-therapeutic treatment, such as cosmetic 
surgery, would not generally be so described.”33 On this basis, Basten JA concluded 
                                                            
29 Ibid, [10]. 
30 Similar provisions exist in some but not all of the civil liability legislation in other Australian jurisdictions:  
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s28C(2)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s3B(1)(a);  Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s3B(1). 
By contrast, the South Australian civil liability damages provisions are expressly limited to “negligence or some 
other unintentional tort”: Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s51(a)(ii). As discussed above, there are no express 
exclusions for intentional torts in Queensland, Australian Capital Territory or the Northern Territory. For a 
discussion of these provisions see: Tina Cockburn and Bill Madden, ‘Intentional Torts and the Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld)’ (2005) 25 Queensland Lawyer 310; Peter Handford, ‘Intention, negligence and the Civil Liability 
Acts’ (2012) 86 Australian Law Journal 100. 
31 Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223,, [26]. 
32 Ibid, [30]. 
33 Ibid. 
that it would have been sufficient for Mr Dean’s purposes to establish that Dr Phung 
knew at the time of giving the relevant advice that the treatment was not reasonably 
necessary.34 
 
After reviewing the findings at trial, as to the intent of Dr Phung, Basten JA found that 
the “preferable inference is that the dentist probably did not believe at the time that 
he carried out the treatment that it was necessary given the injury suffered by Mr 
Dean.”35 This inference was supported by the following factors: 
(a) the blow to the appellant's chin resulted in limited damage to a small number of otherwise 
healthy teeth; 
(b) the proper treatment identified by the experts did not involve root canal therapy, metal 
bonded crowns on all teeth or bridging between teeth; 
(c) none of the experts could envisage circumstances in which a reasonably competent doctor 
would believe such irreversible treatment to be warranted; 
(d) although the execution of the dental work was incompetent and parts of the report to the 
insurer were internally incoherent, there was no clear evidence favouring the view that the 
dentist was an incompetent diagnostician; 
(e) in circumstances where there was a clear inference that dental services were provided for 
the financial benefit of the dentist rather than any appropriate treatment of the appellant, the 
failure of the dentist to give evidence was a matter available to confirm that inference, and 
(f) although the conclusion involved an element of dishonesty on the part of the dentist, the 
strength of the inference available on the evidence was sufficient to allow such a conclusion 
to be reached on the balance of probabilities.36 
 
Those findings permitted application of section 3B(1)(a), hence the assessment of 
damages without application of the provisions constraining damages awards.  
Given the various findings above, the Court of Appeal reassessed damages without 
the constraints applied by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Exemplary damages in 
the sum of $150,000 were also awarded. 
 
The simpler conclusion to be drawn from the findings of the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal in Dean v Phung is that the starting point for consideration as to whether 
the legislation is excluded must be the wording of the legislation. The legislation may 
                                                            
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, [47] 
36 Ibid. 
be excluded even in claims for negligence; if there is an intentional act with inferred 
intent to cause injury. 
 
Vitiating Ostensible Consent 
The more complex issue, given the dissenting opinions, remained whether vitiation 
of ostensible consent without fraud.  
 
Basten JA summarised the law relating to consent to medical treatment, and the 
circumstances in which it may be vitiated: 
The authorities thus support four broad principles. First, consent is validly given in respect of 
medical treatment in circumstances where the patient has been given basic information as to 
the nature of the proposed procedure. However, where the nature of the procedure has been 
misrepresented consent will be vitiated. Thus, if it were demonstrated, objectively, that a 
procedure of the nature carried out was not capable of addressing the patient's condition, 
there can have been no valid consent. 
Secondly, assuming a proposed treatment capable of providing an intended therapeutic 
effect, for the purposes of determining the effect of a misrepresentation it is necessary to 
distinguish between core elements, which define the nature of the procedure, and peripheral 
elements, including risks of adverse outcomes. Absence of advice or wrong advice as to the 
latter may constitute a breach of the practitioner's duty of care, but will not vitiate the consent. 
Thirdly, the motive of the practitioner in seeking consent to proposed 'treatment' may 
establish that what was proposed was not intended to be treatment at all, so that the nature of 
the act to which consent was ostensibly given was not the act carried out. Thus, although the 
conduct was objectively capable of constituting therapeutic treatment, if it were in fact 
undertaken solely for a non-therapeutic purpose not revealed to the patient, there will be no 
relevant consent. 
Fourthly, at least where a real issue has been raised as to the existence of a valid consent, 
the burden of proof will lie on the defendant practitioner to establish that the procedure was 
undertaken with consent.37 
2. White v Johnston 
In White v Johnston the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered an appeal by 
Ms White, a former dentist, from a decision of the District Court of New South Wales. 
The trial judge had held that the treatment carried out by the appellant on her former 
patient was carried out with knowledge that it was unnecessary and ineffective and 
                                                            
37 Ibid. 
amounted to a trespass. There was an award of  damages in the sum of $330,397, 
including exemplary damages ($150,000) and aggravated damages ($10,000). No 
determination was made on an alternative claim of negligence.  
The main issue for consideration on appeal was whether the respondent’s consent 
had been vitiated so as to found liability in trespass. Other issues related to the 
admissibility of “tendency evidence”; and the award of exemplary damages.38 The 
leading judgement was delivered by Leeming JA (with whom Barrett JA39 and 
Emmett JA40 agreed).  
Unlike the outcome in Dean v Phung, Leeming JA held that the evidence did not 
support a finding that the treatment was totally unnecessary and carried out for the 
purpose of extracting money from the government rather than treating the patient. In 
addition, His Honour concluded that the trial judge had erred in his view that the 
defendant practitioner bore the onus of disproving fraud; in relying upon tendency 
evidence;41 and in the award of exemplary damages.42 Accordingly, he allowed the 
appeal, set aside the judgement and ordered a retrial on the undetermined claim of 
negligence.43 
Consent to medical treatment: general principles  
In White v Johnston, after considering Dean v Phung, Leeming JA made some broad 
observations about the nature of consent in medical cases,44 which are summarised 
below: 
a) Medical treatment without consent amounts to trespass and may also be a 
crime, subject to exceptional cases, such as an emergency and or statutory 
authorisation.45 
                                                            
38 Ibid [21]. 
39 Ibid [2]–[4]. 
40 Ibid [18]‐[19]. 
41 Issues relating to the admissibility of tendency evidence are considered in White v Johnston [2015] NSWCA 
18 at [134] – [144]. Leeming JA concluded (at [143]) that the tendency evidence was admitted in error: “The 
primary judge erred in admitting the evidence as significantly probative of one “particular matter” (a tendency 
to charge for work never performed) and then relying upon the evidence for a different purpose (a tendency 
to perform wholly unnecessary work with no therapeutic purpose). There was error in using the tendency 
evidence for a different purpose from that for which it had been adduced, to assist in a finding that none of 
the work performed had a therapeutic purpose. To do so was contrary to ss 95 and 97, as well as being 
procedurally unfair…” 
42 As the verdict was set aside, Leeming JA held (at [145]) that this ground (exemplary damages) did not arise 
on appeal, and would not arise on a re‐hearing because exemplary damages are not available in negligence 
claims: s21 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Even if the verdict had not been set aside, Leeming JA would have set 
aside the award of exemplary damages (at [153]): “ In short, the reasons of the primary judge disclose error of 
principle in failing to determine compensatory damages before turning to exemplary damages, and also 
material error of fact in regarding Dean v Phung as relevantly comparable for this purpose. Even had the 
appeal otherwise failed, I would have set aside the award of exemplary damages.”  
43 Ibid [23]; [154]. 
44 Ibid [53]‐[60]. 
45 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (Maron's Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 234, 
Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92 (1914), 93 (Cardozo J).  
b) The form of the consent may be oral or in writing, subject to certain statutory 
exceptions.46 
c) Consent may be express or implied, which is a question of fact in each case.47 
d) Generally speaking, defects in obtaining consent concerning inherent risks, 
generally go to negligence rather than trespass; “the consent necessary to 
negative the offence of battery is satisfied by the patient being advised in 
broad terms as to the nature of the procedure to be performed.”48  
e) Consent will be invalid where the treatment materially departs from that for 
which consent was given.49 
f) Consent may be vitiated where the procedure of the nature carried out was 
not capable of addressing the patient's condition; or it was solely motivated by 
non-therapeutic purposes.50 
Vitiating ostensible consent: consent motivated by a non-therapeutic purpose 
In White v Johnston, the Court’s attention was focused on whether it had been 
established that the appellant’s treatment was motivated solely by a non-therapeutic 
purpose, such that consent would be vitiated according to the principles enunciated 
in Dean v Phung.  
Leeming JA accepted that while criminal law cases may be relied upon to establish 
that, while consent may be vitiated by fraud,51 “the only cases in which fraud 
indisputably vitiates consent in these matters are cases of fraud as to the nature of 
the act done”.52   
Where the improper purpose falls short of fraud, consent may be vitiated where the 
practitioner’s purpose is solely non-therapeutic. This was explained by Leeming JA 
as follows:  
… patient’s consent may be vitiated in the manner identified in Dean v Phung where the 
practitioner’s unrevealed purpose is solely non-therapeutic. That qualification is important. 
Very often, conduct occurs for multiple purposes. It is no criticism to observe that many if not 
most medical practitioners would attend their hospitals and surgeries each day in part for the 
purpose of deriving income including by rendering invoices to government (unless they are 
independently wealthy, only by so doing can they pay their staff and other expenses of their 
practices).53 
                                                            
46 For example, Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW), ss 19‐20B. 
47 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88, [40(2)]. 
48 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490.  
49 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, 443 (Bristow J). 
50 Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223, [61]‐ [64]. 
51 White v Johnston  [2015] NSWCA 18, [66] –[67] (Emmett JA), agreeing with Basten JA in Dean v Phung [2012] 
NSWCA 223, [51]: “It would be a startling result if the medical procedure which was properly characterised as 
criminal did not give rise to a civil cause of action”. 
52 White v Johnston  [2015] NSWCA 18, [68] (Emmett JA) citing R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23, 43 (Stephen J). 
53 Ibid, [71]. 
His Honour went on to note that the majority in Dean v Phung favoured an objective 
test,54 in the sense that the practitioner’s motive was irrelevant. However, Macfarlan 
JA, dissented on this point, concluding that in addition to establishing that the 
treatment was exclusively for non-therapeutic purposes, it was also necessary to 
establish improper motive (fraud or reckless indifference as to whether the treatment 
was necessary).55  
Applying this law to the facts of White v Johnston, Justice Leeming found that the 
respondent had clearly consented to the treatment provided “either by words or 
conduct”.56  
As to whether this ostensible consent was vitiated, His Honour concluded that, unlike 
in Dean v Phung where the expert evidence established that the treatment was 
“unnecessary and unwarranted”, which was conceded by Dr Phung,57 in this case 
“there was no evidence that the filling and building up were incapable of constituting 
a therapeutic response to Ms Johnston’s condition.”58  
Onus of vitiating consent fraudulently obtained 
Having made these findings, His Honour went on to consider who bore the onus of 
establishing that the patient’s consent was invalid. Although the trial judge had 
proceeded on the basis that the dentist had the onus of establishing that the consent 
was “genuine and valid,”59 Justice Leeming concluded otherwise:   
I do not accept that a defendant medical practitioner is subject to a legal burden to disprove 
fraud, or something which is tantamount to fraud, although he or she may become subject to 
an evidentiary burden to do so.60  
After noting that a finding of fraud cannot be made unless it has been pleaded and 
particularised, and put to the defendant on cross examination,61 His Honour (as 
indicated in the quote above) held that the patient bore the legal onus of establishing 
that consent had been vitiated by fraud, and that the health care professional may 
then face an evidentiary burden to displace a finding of fraud which might otherwise 
be made.62 He concluded: 
… I consider that the legal burden remained at all times for Ms Johnston to prove that Ms White’s 
treatment bore no therapeutic purpose, if that was how an absence of valid consent were to be 
                                                            
54 Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223, [65] (Basten JA, with whom Beazley P agreed). Leeming JA noted (at [74]) 
that “Sir Frederick long ago identified, in this context, a solely objective qualification which aligns with the view 
of the majority”: F Pollock, The Law of Torts (5th ed 1897 p 153; 12th ed 1923 p 160). 
55 Ibid, [94]. Leeming JA noted (at [74]) that this “more onerous test” has attracted the support of I Kerridge, M 
Lowe and C Stewart, Ethics and law for the health professions, Federation Press, 4th ed, 2013, p 343. 
56 White v Johnston  [2015] NSWCA 18, [75]. 
57 Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA 223, [15]. 
58 White v Johnston  [2015] NSWCA 18, [77]. 
59 Ibid, [79]. 
60 Ibid, [83]. 
61 Ibid, [85]. 
62 Ibid, [86]. 
established. To the extent that his Honour approached the matter differently, there was error. To 
the extent that Ms Johnston sought to defend the judgment by reference to onus, I reject her 
submission. There was no evidence to support a finding that none of Ms White’s treatment was 
therapeutic or that Ms White’s purpose was wholly non-therapeutic, so as to shift an evidentiary 
burden to Ms White.63  
Broader question: onus of proving consent in medical trespass cases 
Justice Leeming’s conclusions that the patient failed to discharge her onus of 
vitiating consent, resolved the appeal in favour of the appellant dentist.64 
Nevertheless, he made some obiter observations on the broader question of the 
onus of proving consent, before proceeding to address the remaining grounds of 
appeal. 
After considering the earlier cases,65 His Honour came to the preliminary view that 
the patient bears the legal onus of proof of absence of consent in medical trespass 
cases:  
Those matters further reinforce my conclusion that, at least in the case where a patient’s 
consent is said to have been rendered invalid by reason of the fraud, or conduct tantamount 
to fraud, the onus remains with the patient to establish fraud. If what I have outlined above be 
correct, then the broader position is straightforward: a patient who sues in assault and battery 
in all cases bears the legal burden of establishing an absence of consent on his or her part, 
although that proposition is undeniably contrary to what has been said by McHugh J and 
Basten JA. I should make it clear that my views in section (e) of these reasons have been 
reached without the benefit of full argument on the point and are necessarily therefore 
preliminary. None of the foregoing is to deny that in many cases where evidence supportive of 
fraud by the medical practitioner has been adduced, the evidentiary burden will be borne by 
the medical practitioner.66 
An intentional act with intention to cause harm?: Civil Liability Act 2012 (NSW) 
intentional torts exclusion 
As noted above, the s3B(1)(a) “intentional torts” exclusion applies to “an intentional 
act that is done with intent to cause injury or death…”67 
Justice Leeming noted that the trial judge did not refer to s3B, but rather “appears to 
have proceeded on the basis that any intentional tort was sufficient.”68 This approach 
was shown to be misconceived given that “[i]t is not a necessary element of assault 
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(and battery) that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff”69; in trespass claims 
“it is the act and not the injury which must be intentional.”70 
Accordingly, although “no doubt Ms White’s conduct was intentional,”71 as the 
primary judge did not make an express finding that there was an intention to cause 
injury, and because “the evidence could not sustain any implicit finding that Ms White 
intended to cause injury”, the exclusion did not apply in this case.72 
Concluding comments 
Dean v Phung highlighted the financial advantages of a claim falling outside the 
damages limitations of civil liability legislation, perhaps subject to limited insurance 
coverage.73 
White v Johnston reminds us that proof of trespass, or the application of section 
3B(1)(a), will be dependent on the strength of the evidence (perhaps with limited 
scope for tendency evidence) and perhaps with only limited assistance to a plaintiff 
from the onus of proof. 
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